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Autocracy-Sustaining vs. Democratic Federalism: 
Explaining the divergent trajectories of Territorial Politics in Russia and 
Western Europe 
 
1.  Understanding the dynamics of territorial politics in Western Europe and 
Russia  
 
Recently, Russia has become a comparative object in the studies of federalism.
1
 The development of Russian federalism and its different aspects had already 
inspired comparative analysis with the early United States (Figueredo et al., 2007), 
Mexico and even with communist Eastern Germany (Gel’man, 2006, 2008). The 
federal structure of Russia of the 1990s has also been compared with that of the new 
millennium (Burgess, 2009,; Sakwa, 2010). Indeed, the framework of comparative 
federalism contributes to our understanding of the Russian territorial structure and its 
future development. However, surprisingly, few scholars have compared Russian 
federalism with territorial politics in Western Europe’s federal or multi-level states. 
For two theoretical reasons we think that such a comparison is useful and can develop 
our understanding of the dynamics of federalism in general and Russia in particular.  
First, Western Europe’s federal or multi-level states present a wide variety of 
federal or multi-level models. Plurinational states (Keating, 2001), like Spain, the UK 
and Belgium devolved powers in order to accommodate plurinational differences. 
‘Coming together’ (Stepan, 2001) federations like Switzerland developed organically, 
out of a more loosely confederal order; whereas the federal character of Austria and 
Germany is partially home-grown, but also partially crafted by outside forces 
following a period of totalitarian rule (Niclauβ, 1998). In other words, compared with 
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federal states elsewhere the diversity of territorial politics in Western Europe provides 
a broader pallet against which the Russian experience can be more meaningfully 
compared.  
Second, in Western Europe, change and continuity in territorial arrangements 
are linked to a set of endogenous safeguards (Bednar, 2009) of territorial politics. 
These ‘endogenous safeguards’ relate to the constitutional embeddedness of territorial 
self-rule and the capacity of the sub-state entities to participate in central decisions 
that affect their competencies or interests (shared rule; Elazar, 1987). In tandem, 
Constitutional Courts or Supreme Courts may operate as adjudicators of central-
regional or inter-regional disputes (for an overview of the ‘safeguards of federalism, 
see in particular Bednar, 2009; Filippov, et al., 2004).  
Usually, the above design features go hand in hand with the presence of a 
multi-level party system. In Western Europe, such multi-level party systems have 
emerged from organizing elections at multiple levels. Parties have to select 
candidates, draft party programs, canvas members and govern (or form the 
opposition) at multiple levels of the state. Multi-level or statewide parties in particular 
have the potential of providing a strong ‘integrative’ force in the party (and federal) 
system as they must strike a balance between satisfying regional demands (self-rule) 
and projecting polity-wide interests (Ordeshook et al., 2004; Thorlakson, 2007; Fabre 
2011; Fabre and Swenden 2013). Thus, in Western Europe, the introduction of 
territorial arrangements where they were called for promoted or even deepened 
democracy. Federalism assumes a ‘dispersal of political authority’, and in this sense, 
the proper functioning of a federal order should allow room for the control of the 
federal and sub-state governments by different political majorities. This basic 
requirement of federalism is easier to achieve under conditions of liberal or 
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democratic governance (Filippov et al., 2004). This is so because divided political 
control is more likely where key liberal democratic assumptions hold, such as the ‘the 
rule of law, free and regular elections by secret ballot, an independent judiciary, a free 
media, the protection of individual freedoms and human rights, and the legitimacy of 
government opposition’ (Burgess and Gagnon, 2010, p.: 4; Kincaid, 2010). In sum, 
territorial autonomy and multi-level democracy have become intrinsically linked (but 
see Watts, 2010 for a more historical perspective)   
In contrast, as we will argue, Russian federalism under Putin has been 
strongest where sub-national democracy was at its weakest. In other words, ‘political 
authority’ can be dispersed even if the requirements of liberal democracy are not 
fulfilled. In the pre-Putin era, authoritarian sub-national regimes co-existed with a 
relatively democratic centre, whereas since Putin assumed the Presidency and then 
Premiership of the federation, Russian federalism moved into a more authoritarian 
direction without in fact fully sacrificing the territorial dispersal of political authority. 
By studying the relationship between federalism and democracy in cases where both 
concepts are mutually reinforcing (as in Western Europe) with a critical case where 
they are not, we can shed a clearer comparative light on this relationship. Too often, 
assumptions about the instability of federal states have focused on cases of democratic 
breakdown (such as Pakistan or Nigeria), or of secession following democratization 
(Yugoslavia). Conversely, the experience of federalism in Western Europe has been 
compared most frequently with that of federalism in Canada, the US, or Australia. 
Yet, these ‘more logical’ comparisons can tell us little about the conditions under 
which federalism and democracy are mutually reinforcing or when they are not.  
The article is structured in three parts. In the first part, we illustrate the 
‘contested’ nature of Russian federalism and compare it with the dynamics of 
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territorial politics in Western Europe, which especially in some plurinational states 
(Belgium, Spain and the UK) also shows elements of contestation. In the second part, 
we show how that contestation has led to the transformation of Russian federalism 
from a centrifugal to relatively centralized federation in the span of two decades. This 
development contrasts with the deepening of territorial autonomy in Western Europe. 
We attribute the transformation of Russia into a centralized federation to two 
important factors. The first factor points at the comparative weakness of safeguards 
that are endogenous to federalism (self-rule, shared rule and the Court as an impartial 
umpire). These safeguards are stronger in the West European context, and thus 
preclude as drastic a rescaling of territorial authority without concurrent constitutional 
reform. In other words, federal form and practice are more closely interlinked in 
Western Europe than in Russia where the transformation into a centralized federalism 
has been made possible without significant constitutional reform. The second factor 
points at the changing power-dependencies between the centre and the regions. In the 
West European context, these changes are closely tied to the working of multi-level 
democracy itself, in particular the dynamics of regional and multi-level party 
competition. In constrast, in Russia they are linked to who has captured key resources 
of state control (Hellman 1998). The capacity of the Russian centre to capture these 
sources has been lowest where it faces authoritarian regional governments. As such, 
Russian federalism has remained strongest where regional democracy is at its 
weakest, effectively producing an ‘autocracy-sustaining’ federation. The final part 
summarizes our key findings and what they mean for how we conceptualize the 
relation between federalism and democracy.  
 
2. Contested Federalism 
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All multi-level systems are dynamic to some extent, but major shifts in authority 
across time (either from the centre to the regions or vice versa) are often linked to the 
absence of a broad based consensus at the onset of the federalization process. The 
nature of the Russian multi-level state was highly contested from the start as political 
actors not only mobilized against the constitutional settlement but even preferred to 
disobey it. There was an uneasy tension between the pro-regionalist and asymmetric 
logic embedded in the Federation Treaty (1992), the bilateral Treaties which the 
centre negotiated with several Russian Republics throughout the 1990s and the more 
symmetric and centrist logic of the amended Russian constitution (1993). Under 
Yeltsin’s Presidency, the balance tilted in favor of the regions, resulting into what 
Sakwa (2010) refers to as a state of ‘segmented regionalism’. In contrast, under 
Putin’s Presidency (and Premiership), central authority was reinforced and the 
principle of regional autonomy undermined. This transformation in the space of just 
two decades is unique to Russia, and goes against the trend of multi-national states in 
Western Europe which have seen the consolidation or even furtherance of regional 
autonomy.  
 
A contested Russian federal constitution: which and whose constitution, how much 
asymmetry?  
Following the implosion of the Soviet Union, Russia had to draft its own 
constitution. That process of constitution-building was staggered, and contested, but it 
stood beyond doubt that Russia was to retain its federal format, initially made up of 
89 regions.  
 The retention of a federal structure was logical in view of the turbulent years 
preceding the formation of the Russian federation and especially of the willingness of 
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the centre to bargain with regional elites. The sudden ‘democratization’ of Russia 
meant that ethno-regional elites which were already granted a degree of (formal) self-
rule in the Soviet federation found themselves in a strong bargaining position vis-à-vis 
the centre (Brubaker 1996). Russian republics sought to emulate the autonomy-
maximizing strategies of the Union Republics vis-à-vis the Soviet centre. In the case 
of two Russian republics (Tatarstan and Checheno-Ingushetiya) sovereignty was even 
sought outside of the Russian framework (Zuber 2010: 558). The Russian regions 
(republics, national-territorial entities and administrative territorial entities) benefited 
from a much weakened Soviet centre, and, after its disappearance, Russian centre 
(Brubaker 1996, Bunce 1999, Roeder 2007). They negotiated separate sub-treaties 
with the Russian centre, which was annexed as a Treaty to the (1978) Russian 
constitution. This Federation Treaty was signed in 1992 and committed the ‘lump’ of 
the Soviet Union to form a Russian federation but in doing so, also favored regions 
with a republican status. In 1993 an agreement on a new Constitution for the Russian 
federation followed, but it did not include the Federation Treaty that was signed a year 
earlier.  
The constitution of 1993 is the main document outlining the federal structure 
of contemporary Russia, but the inconsistencies between the prerogatives that derive 
from the Federation Treaty and the actual constitutional text explain part of the 
bargaining logic and instability of Russian federalism that followed. About a third of 
the 137 articles of the Russian constitution are dedicated to the federative structure of 
the Russian Federation (Vaslavsky and Mironiuk, 2010b: 40). To circumvent its 
contested character, especially in some of the republics which felt they were better off 
under the Federation Treaty, the new Constitution was only put to a polity-wide 
popular vote without a requirement for concurrent majorities across a majority of the 
Comment [M2]: Might you mean 
‘rump’?  
 7 
state legislatures. The results of the polity-wide referendum were contradictory 
(Vaslavsky and Mironiuk, 2010b: 41). Although 58.4 percent of the population 
supported the Constitution, it was rejected in 8 republics and 10 regions.
2
 In a further 
5 republics, the draft was not passed at all due to low turnout (less than 50% of 
regional population).
3
  
Russian republics saw in federalism a means to accommodate their multi-
ethnic society, and bilateral and asymmetric arrangements with the centre were 
considered as a logical consequence of recognizing Russia’s plurinational diversity. 
The latest census also identifies no less than 182 officially recognized nationalities in 
Russia. Next to the ethnic groups, the centre-periphery cleavage manifests itself in the 
peripheral South of Russia and Siberia, both territories with an increased sense of 
“cultural regionalism” or identity (Vaslavsky and Mironiuk 2010a: 30). A federal and 
asymmetric constitution that recognizes these socio-demographic and economic 
realities on the ground ensued as the most appropriate constitutional form for Russia 
(Ross 2010: 167-68).  
However, a large share of Russian politicians governing the centre (and 
Russians more in general) considered the need for asymmetry and special recognition 
as minimal. Notwithstanding the different types of units in the Russian federation 
(Republics, krais, cities of federal significance, autonomous oblasts, autonomous 
okrugs), some Russian scholars underline what they see as the unusual homogeneity 
of the Russian population along cultural, religious, and ethnic lines. They stress the 
importance of a “Russian ethnic mega-focus” (Vaslavsky and Mironiuk 2010a: 29). 
Indeed, data of the last three all-Russia censuses (1959; 1989; 2002), demonstrate 
little change in the variation of ethnic and cultural self-identification of the population 
(see Table 1).  The main ethnic group – Eastern Slavs – comprises about 84% of the 
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overall population - and about 98 % of the population speaks Russian (Vaslavsky and 
Mironiuk, 2010a: 30). The vast bulk (around 80 percent) of the Russian federation 
also lives in more than 50 ‘ordinary’ oblasts and krais or the main cities of St 
Petersburg or Moscow which are predominantly ethnically Russian (Stoner-Weiss 
2004: 302). In this sense, the Staatsvolk (O’Leary 2001) is clearly Russian as it 
represents four out of five citizens in the state.
4
  
 
Table 1 about here  
 
The different viewpoints between the dominant Russian titular ethnic group 
which preferred a more centralized and symmetric federation, and the ethnic or 
‘peripheral’ regions which propagated a more decentralized and asymmetric 
federation is reflected in the ‘inconclusiveness and inherent contradictions’ in the 
Federative Treaty (1992) and Constitution (1993). Both have been described as 
incomplete ‘treaties’ (Filippov 2004: 62) due to their lack of secure enforcement or 
implementation guarantees. The Constitution reflects this ambiguity in part 1, article 5 
which states that all regions are equal subjects of the Federation (Vaslavsky and 
Mironiuk, 2010b) while part 2 and 4 articles 5, 64, and 68 recognize differences in the 
constitutional status of different types of regions (e.g., Republics have constitutions 
not charters, they have presidents not governors, etc.). Even if these differences may 
simply boil down to ‘constitutional window-dressing’ for what is in essence a 
symmetric federation (Smirnyagin 2010), the main trend of the 1990s was primarily to 
keep the federation symmetrical in form but asymmetrical in its actual practice.  
For instance, Article 72 which deals with concurrent competences that are 
shared between the central and regional governments applies to all units of the 
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federation, irrespective of their status (Smirnyagin 2010). Yet, at the same time, 
between 1994 and 1998 president Yeltsin signed bilateral treaties with a number of 
regional executives. The first treaties were justified as ‘privileges to regions which 
“deserve” them, without formal specification of the criteria meriting ‘special 
recognition’. All bilateral treaties were signed by the President of the Russian 
Federation and the regional executives but they were not subject to ratification by the 
Russian Parliament or regional legislative parliaments (Smirnyagin 2010: 47-48). 
Since the content of these treaties was very different from each other (Smirnyagin 
2010: 47), they resulted into building a highly asymmetric federal state in practice. 
However, the fact that 42 of the 46 bilateral treaties violated the provisions of the 
federal Constitution (Ross 2010: 169) made it easier for Vladmir Putin to terminate all 
of them once he was elected President of the Russian Federation. Yet, their 
termination has not fully eradicated the presence of asymmetric practices in the 
operation of Russian federalism (see further).   
 
Federalism in Western Europe: Less contestation, more stability?  
Compared with Russia, few West European states have had similarly contested 
constitutions from the outset. Switzerland is a classic coming together federation, with 
the oldest cantons dating back to the Middle Ages (Linder 2010). The formation of 
modern Switzerland as a federal state in the 19
th
 century was not painless: it followed 
a brief civil war in which a number of Catholic cantons combined against the 
Protestant dominated majority, but the latter imposed its will (and in the process a 
federal state structure) against the preferences of the former (who did not endorse the 
1848 constitution). In time however, the Sunderbund cantons acquiesced in the 
consolidation of Switzerland as a federation, in part because the state developed 
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power-sharing practices at the centre and has retained a quite decentralized federal 
structure throughout (the most decentralized of all West European federations).  
Although Austria and Germany rebuilt federal structures out of fascist 
dictatorships, the nature of their federal regimes post World War II showed a strong 
resemblance to the federal structures that existed during the interbellum, or in the case 
of Germany, the Wilhelmine period (1870-1914). For instance, following World War 
II the Allied Powers insisted on a more decentralized German federation with more 
clearly disentangled powers between the federal centre and the Länder (Niclauβ 
1998). The breakup of Prussia, migration from what was former German territory into 
post-War West Germany and a strong sense of German identity prevented the 
centrifugal, ethnic bargaining that emerged in Post-Soviet Russia (Conradt 2004). 
With the exception of Bavaria (which found the federation too centralized), all 
German Länder endorsed the federal constitution.  
The contested nature of Russian federalism (and its rapid evolution since 
1990) does, however, show some parallels with the rapidly changing constitutional 
set-up of plurinational Spain, Belgium and the UK. The Spanish constitution, like the 
Russian (and Austrian and German) constitutions, emerged from a non-democratic 
context, but (unlike the Austrian and German constitutions) also developed without 
considerable influence from outside forces. However, the Basque Country, Navarre, 
Catalonia and Galicia, could reclaim degrees of self-rule that dated back to the Middle 
Ages and these territories also benefited from a considerable amount of self-rule 
during the (short-lived) pre-Francoist Second Republic (Moreno 2001). Francoist 
elites (and the monarch) played a crucial role in the transition from a dictatorial to a 
democratic regime. The territorial dimension of Spain was recognized by setting up a 
system of ‘autonomous communities’, but as in Russia where different types of 
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regions were recognized, the Constituent Assembly recognized the special status of 
the historic regions by entrusting them with a higher and faster trajectory towards self-
rule (Agranoff 1999). Although a majority of the Basque people and parties refused to 
endorse the constitution, it had more widespread support among the rest of Spain 
(including the other historic communities). Furthermore, with constitution-making 
preceding the reinstatement of self-rule, regional level elites in Spain were in a 
comparably weaker position than in Russia to project their interest vis-à-vis the centre 
(Linz and Stepan, 1996).   
Like in Russia, there remains a tension between the notion of the state built 
around a dominant Castilian-speaking or ‘Spanish’ majority nation and that of Spain 
as a plurinational state encompassing various nations within. Article 2 of the Spanish 
constitution provides a wonderful expression of this ambiguity as it signals the 
commitments towards an indivisible and unified Spanish state which simultaneously 
is made up of various autonomous communities and nationalities (Moreno 2001).
5
 
This tension between two visions of Spain; one built around a Spanish nation (at best 
comprising minority nationalities within) and another as a plurinational state has 
generated two opposing dynamics. Unlike in Russia, regional autonomy has deepened 
unmistakenly since 1978; but this has not been a linear process (with the centre 
seeking to scale back, reign in and homogenize the autonomy process at various 
points in time). The contestation of the recently revised Catalan statute of autonomy 
(in particular by the Popular Party, the party in control of the Spanish government 
since late 2011), and the controversial Constitutional Court ruling which followed on 
from this, demonstrate the lack of consensus on the future direction of the Spanish 
state (Colino 2009; Keating and Wilson 2009). 
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Like Spain, the plurinational states of Belgium and the UK emerged out of 
unitary or union-like regimes. There were no regional level elites to bargain with (in a 
sense of regional politicians rooted in a regional executive or parliament) when the 
federalization process started. Rather, in Belgium, central level elites found it 
increasingly difficult to find common ground on a range of issues that divided 
opinions between the French and Dutch-speaking language communities. 
Consequently, they started to ‘hollow out’ the centre by entrusting an increasing range 
of powers to Communities and Regions (Hooghe 2004; Deschouwer 2009). Yet there 
is disagreement about conceiving the language communities (the Flemish preference) 
or the territorial Regions (the Francophone preference) as the ‘building blocks’ of the 
federation. Although these tensions have been partially resolved by setting up an 
ingenious and asymmetric construction of Regions and Community governments; the 
failure to make a clear choice for either logic has had contradictory effects on the 
institutional stability of the Belgian federation. At one level it contributed to growing 
opposition among a Flemish political majority to further commit to the Belgian state; 
at another level it rendered the practical realization of more Flemish autonomy, let 
alone independence, more cumbersome given the lack of a clear agreement on the 
future Flemish state boundaries and especially the role of Brussels therein (BRANS et 
al., De Winter and Swenden, 2010).      
UK devolution is even younger than Spanish, Belgian (and Russian) 
federalism. Although the UK originates from a set of treaties or unions (between 
Wales and England, between Scotland and England), the state was governed as a 
union-state which tolerated the distinctiveness of Scotland and Wales by recognizing 
its legal tradition, language, Church or distinctive education system. Throughout most 
of the 20
th
 century, the Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland Offices (the latter only 
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between 1972 and 1999) operated as field administrations, headed by a secretary of 
state in the UK government (Mitchell 2008). The legitimacy of the centre to rule 
Scotland and Wales declined when the ties that bound these nations to the UK 
weakened. The decay of the Empire and the encapsulation of these nations within the 
then European Economic Community made them also less dependent on the UK 
centre for their economic survival (Dardanelli 2006). The de facto scaling back of the 
autonomy of the territorial administrations coupled with unpopular welfare-state 
retrenchment policies during the Conservative period in central government (1979-
1990) eroded the support of that party in the Celtic nations, and in the process, also 
delegitimized central rule in Scotland and Wales. Ultimately, a UK Labour 
government introduced devolution (through a UK Parliamentary Act) in 1998, hoping 
to consolidate its electoral support and the centre’s legitimacy in the eyes of the 
Scottish, Welsh (and Northern Irish) electorate (Bogdanor 1999). Devolution itself 
was subject to popular referendums in Scotland, Wales and following a peace 
agreement, in Northern Ireland as well. Yet, thirteen years on, devolution remains a 
‘moving target’ (Stolz 2010) with a strengthening of the territorial self-rule 
arrangements, or the secession of Scotland from the UK as possible outcomes.  
The territorial arrangements of Spain, Belgium and the UK are contested and 
remain prone to instability (especially in the current context of scarce resources 
following the 2008 global fiscal crisis and the resulting Euro-crisis). The contested 
nature of the Russian federalism was even more outspoken, given the numerous 
bilateral treaties which violated the spirit of the federal constitution. Yet, twenty years 
on, in Russia, these contradictions have led to a more centralized state, which many 
authors consider as neither federal nor democratic. In contrast, in Spain, Belgium and 
the UK, these tensions have led to further decentralization (which in all three cases 
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could lead to confederalism or the secession of parts of the state). In the following 
section, we will seek to explain what made these different trajectories possible.  
 
3. Explaining Authority Migration (I): the role of ‘territorial’ safeguards   
 
Constitutionally Entrenched Self-Rule 
 
In Western Europe, the constitutional arrangements give a relatively adequate 
reflection of the state of territorial politics. Most territorial arrangements are 
constitutionally embedded (de iure or de facto). Therefore, shifts in territorial 
autonomy are linked to constitutional change. For instance, the German constitution 
was amended in 1990-2 to accommodate the entry of five new Länder following 
unification and again in 2006 to strengthen regional self-rule. Similarly, the Swiss and 
Austrian constitutions were amended in recent decades to strengthen respectively the 
fiscal autonomy of Swiss cantons or to secure the participation of Austrian Länder in 
EU decision-making. The larger the scale of territorial rescaling, the more frequent 
and more drastic the process of territorial constitutional change. For instance, the 
transformation of unitary into federal Belgium is the result of four rounds of 
constitutional reform (1970, 1980, 1988-9, 1992-3) and additional territorial reforms 
through constitutional change have occurred since (2000-1, 2012-). In Spain, the 
constitution provides different routes to autonomy and the self-rule arrangements for 
the ‘slow’ and ‘fast’ route autonomous have been periodically adjusted as a result of 
bilateral pacts between the two large state-wide parties (PP and PSOE); the parties in 
regional government and –where necessary- the regional electorates. Notwithstanding 
UK parliamentary sovereignty, the self-rule arrangements for Scotland, Wales and 
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Northern Ireland depend on de facto Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish parliamentary 
consent, and substantive revisions of the relevant UK parliamentary acts do not take 
place without their agreement – or as in the case of the amended Government of 
Wales Act in 2012, the people.  
In Russia however, the nature and direction of territorial change is not linked to 
the nature and direction of constitutional change. Hence the centrifugal direction in 
which Russian federalism developed during the 1990s occurred despite the limited 
self and shared rule provisions under the relatively centralized Russian constitution. 
The centralized nature of the Russian federation is reflected in the long list of 
exclusive (Art.71) and concurrent competencies with federal paramountcy (Art 72) in 
the Russian constitution. The Russian centre also controls significant redistributive 
and distributive policies (education, health, infrastructure and culture) and it raises the 
most important taxes.
6
 However, the constitution is only a limited guideline in seeking 
to understand the dynamics of Russian federalism. The discrepancy between 
constitutional form and federal practice is important because as Sakwa (2010: 602) 
observed, the ‘dual nature’ of the Russian state implies that the state operates under 
two parallel systems of law, one in which the ‘normative state’ applies ‘sanctioned 
principles of rationality and impartial legal norms’; and a parallel ‘prerogative state’ 
in which ‘the state [i.e. not necessarily the centre alone] exercises power arbitrarily 
and without constraints, unrestrained by law.’   
With the exception of Switzerland (and the Basque Country in relation to Spain), 
most territorial arrangements in Western Europe have retained important centralized 
features. For instance, most West European regions depend on the central government 
for key redistributive policies (social security), reflecting a normative preference for a 
polity-wide ‘social citizenship’. This preference is linked in turn to the development 
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of welfare regimes that grew out of a pronounced struggle between capital and labor 
interests (more intense for instance than in the United States) or between 
economically conservative and trade union supported Labour Parties (Obinger et al. 
2005; McEwen and Moreno 2005). Serving this central redistributive role, most 
important tax levers are usually kept central in Western Europe (corporate income, 
personal income, VAT or sales taxes), as in Russia, leading to vertical fiscal 
imbalances (Swenden 2006: 109). Like in Russia, West European governments seek 
to bridge these imbalances by redistributing money from wealthier regions (which 
contribute more to the federal tax source) to the poorer regions (which contribute 
less). 
On the other hand, compared with Russia, West European sub-national 
governments are given a much stronger say in regulating and providing some of the 
above mentioned distributive policies (education, certainly below the level of higher 
education and culture are usually entirely controlled by the regions, and regions 
usually also have a stake in –the provision of- health care). Crucially however, 
compared with Russia, Western European regions have been able to safeguard their 
autonomy much better than the Russian regions since Putin, narrowing the gap 
between federal form and federal practice. For some West European states, 
constitutionally entrenched shared rule and/or a Constitutional on Supreme Courts 
that adjudicate central-regional or inter-regional disputes of competence have 
provided this safeguard function.  
 
Shared Rule or the participation of regions in central decision-making   
Compared with most West European states,  Russia has always scored low on 
the shared rule criterion (with bilateral, informal channels of influence offsetting the 
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weakness of formalized and multilateral channels). However, under President Putin, 
the capacity of the regions to engage in a bilateral way with the centercentre was 
much reduced (hence the scope for bargaining federalism diminished), as was their 
capacity to project a common regional interest vis-à-vis the centre. In this sense, the 
federation became much more centralized even if the competencies of the regions at 
home were not constitutionally eroded.  
Putin weakened the shared rule dimension of Russian federalism in two ways, 
first of all by his reform of the federal second chamber. The powers of the Federation 
Council, created to represent the interests of the regions, relative to the federal lower 
chamber (State Duma) were always weak (Ross 2010: 171-173). But Putin’s reform 
of the Federation Council’s composition, in which elected Governors and the 
presidents of regional assemblies were replaced as ex officio members with two 
regional representatives, one representing the regional executive (but not the 
Governor) and the other the regional legislature, made the Council an even less potent 
vehicle of regional representation. By removing them from the Council, Governors 
lost immunity from prosecution, and therefore became more subject to central control. 
Furthermore, although regional representatives are selected by the regional 
legislatures and Governors, some studies have suggested that about “75-80 per cent of 
the appointments were either recommended by or cleared with the presidential 
administration” (Remington 2003: 674). Most importantly, most regional 
representatives were not even residents of the regions they were meant to represent 
but residents of Moscow or St. Petersburg (Ross 2010, Remington 2003). By 2002 
nearly half the delegates to the second chamber were Moscow insiders or 
entrepreneurs with a permanent residency in Moscow. The Kremlin also played a 
crucial role in influencing the choice of speaker and deputy speakers (Ross, 2003: 39; 
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Gill 2007: 7-8). Finally, senators could be dismissed from the Council with just one 
fifth of a Council majority, paving the way for the removal of senators which the 
Kremlin deemed ‘unfriendly.’ 
To replace the Federation Council, two new bodies emerged as vehicles for 
intergovernmental coordination: the State Council and the Council of Legislators. The 
State Council, is made up of chief executives of the regions (presidents or governors) 
and meets every three months. A smaller presidium (in which one governor or 
president for each of seven regional districts – see further- resides) convenes monthly. 
Furthermore, the Council has 22 sectorial working groups in which specific policy 
issues (for instance transport, social policy, etc.) can be addressed. Some scholars 
have argued that regional governors, as members of the Federation Council, have a 
direct way of communicating with the Federal President and therefore that “[T]he 
State Council does play an important role in ameliorating disputes that arise between 
federal and regional executives” (Ross 2010: 176). However, the State Council lacks 
law-making powers and only serves as an “advisory” body to the Federal President 
(Ross 2010); it is too weak as a shared rule mechanism. The same observation applies 
to the Council of Legislators which brings together the chairs of regional parliaments 
but lacks law-making powers. As Ross notes, this is “a body that assists the centre in 
monitoring federal legislation in the regions, rather than a body that represents and 
promotes the adoption of regional legislation in the centre” (2010: 176). The 
Council’s main task is to coordinate “the activities of the regions in implementing the 
president’s policies rather than in initiating legislation” (Ross 2010: 176-177). Further 
sector-specific intergovernmental bodies were set up to coordinate federal 
equalization programs or to promote integration in socio-economic, political and 
cultural matters. The seven Federal districts (created by Putin, see further) have been 
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the drivers of functional co-operation among regions located within their district. Yet, 
all of the above intergovernmental bodies only operate in an advisory capacity and 
most of them (like the State Council) could be unilaterally dissolved by the federal 
government. Furthermore, the centre sets their agenda. Intergovernmental relations 
that are instigated by Putin’s seven centrally established Federal Districts also pushed 
intergovernmental co-operation in a top-down direction and slowed down or worked 
against the activities of inter-regional associations that were built from the bottom up 
(such as the Great Volga, Black Earth and Siberian Accords).  
The second way in which Putin diminished the capacity of regional political 
actors to influence the centercentre is by diminishing the capacity of Governors or 
regional assembly members to speak freely. As early as 2000, Putin brought into place 
legislation that authorized him to ‘sack’ governors and ‘dismiss’ regional legislatures, 
admittedly onlynot after serious breaches of federal legislation or constitutional 
principles could be observed (Ross 2003: 40). Four years later, shortly after the 
Beslan tragedy, he dispensed with the direct election of governors altogether. 
 
 The weakness of shared rule arrangements sets Russia on a different path from 
some of the West European multi-level states, especially Germany, Belgium and 
Switzerland. In fact, German federalism has the strongest and most effective shared 
rule channels of any federation. The German Länder can issue an opinion on all 
proposed federal legislation and their explicit consent is required for slightly more 
than half of all federal legislation. The Federation Council (or Bundesrat) which must 
provide this consent or opinion is composed of key members of each of the regional 
governments; the principle of regional representation is strengthened by requesting 
that each region cast a block vote in the Bundesrat. Dozens of intergovernmental 
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forums have developed in parallel to the coordination that takes place in the 
Bundesrat, and these forums often operate under qualified majority voting or even 
unanimity making it difficult for the federal government to ignore regional interests 
(Scharpf 1994; Benz 2009; Kramer 2005; Swenden 2010).  
In Belgium, the federal parliamentary executive is composed of an equal 
number of Dutch and French-speaking members (save the Prime Minister) and can 
only decide by consensus. This consociational executive faces a federal Parliament 
which on Community-sensitive issues is divided between two language groups, with 
members of each group holding a mutual veto-power. Amending legislation that 
touches upon Community or Regionally sensitive issues (such as amending the 
Special Finance Law which regulates how the regions are funded) cannot be 
accomplished without the consent of the key Regions and/or Communities 
(Deschouwer 2009). Therefore, shared rule between the two major language 
Communities (whose borders largely overlap with the two main Regions, - save 
Brussels-) is strongly institutionalized. In turn, a federally anchored Deliberation 
Committee gives each of the players (including the small German Community 
government) a stake in resolving intergovernmental disputes (Swenden and Jans 
2006).  
 Finally, Switzerland, like Belgium has a consociational (though not 
constitutionally mandated) federal executive, even though it does not protect the 
interests of the 26 cantons per se (rather that of the four major Swiss parties which 
reflect Switzerland’s linguistic and religious diversity). Cantons are also equally 
represented in the federal second chamber (which has equal powers to the lower 
house), and they are heard when federal governments are considering submitting 
legislation to federal parliament (Wälti 1996). Cantonal, in addition to popular 
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consent is required for constitutional referendums (more than half of the cantons must 
endorse them), and a minimum of eight cantons can trigger a referendum if they find 
their interests neglected. 
On the other hand, Austria, Spain and in particular the UK devolved setting 
offer fewer opportunities for shared rule. For instance, Austria, which is the most 
centralized of the West European federations has a second chamber in which 
members of Land parliaments are represented, but its powers vis-à-vis the federal 
government are relatively weak. Most intergovernmental institutions that bring 
together Land and federal representatives to discuss issues of mutual concern are at 
best advisory in nature (Obinger 2005). In Spain, only a minority of Spanish senators 
represents the autonomous communities and most senators are elected at the sub-
regional level. Furthermore, the powers of the Spanish Senate are relatively weak. 
Strong historic regions, such as the Basque Country and Catalonia do not necessarily 
seek to strengthen the Senate because it could mean that they have to trade their 
privileged access as bilateral negotiation partners with the centre on certain issues for 
a collective regional right of co-decision (in which they may be outvoted; Roller 
2002). Sectorial conferences bringing together central and regional ministers or civil 
servants have emerged instead, but only with an advisory capacity (Grau i Creus 
2000; Bolleyer 2006). In the UK, shared rule provisions are the weakest. Since 
devolution applies to only about fifteen percent of the UK, civil servants or ministers 
from the devolved governments may be given access to Whitehall on some issues 
(often through bilateral negotiations), but they cannot realistically expect a formalized 
right to participate in the making of all UK legislation or in policies that may affect 
devolved policy interests (directly or indirectly; Trench 2007). Since 1999, the 
secretaries of state for Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales no longer have the 
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prominence in the UK cabinet which they had prior to devolution and their capacity to 
act as intermediaries between the UK and devolved governments has weakened since 
the UK and devolved government are no longer composed of the same parties (largely 
the case since 2007; McEwen et al. 2012). In this sense, the UK is different from 
Spain, where the deepening of self-rule (affecting regions spanning the entire 
territory) has gone hand in hand with a progressive strengthening of shared rule 
mechanisms (Aja and Colino, forthcoming) 
   
The Constitutional Court and judicial review 
 
Limited shared rule provisions could be offset by a Supreme or Constitutional 
Court that safeguards regional autonomy through judicial review. Yet, the Russian 
Constitutional Court has not played an important role in this regard. According to 
Heinemann-Grüder (2010: 197), the Court has largely proved ‘dependent, 
opportunistic and submissive in the face of the wishes of the president’. Given that 
judges are appointed by the centre, criticisms of the Court predate the election of 
Putin as Russian President. For instance, in a ruling in 1995, the Court did not 
invalidate a set of presidential decrees legitimating the centre’s intervention in the 
Chechen conflict (though members of the State Duma and Federation Council 
challenged the president’s decision). Furthermore, Court rulings were often not 
implemented. Under Yeltsin, regions disputed its rulings or simply refused to 
implement them, under Putin, regions implement Constitutional Court rulings to the 
extent that they are seen as an extension of the powers of the President who has the 
mechanisms to enforce compliance (Taylor 2007).  
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In Western Europe, some Constitutional Courts have played a more important 
role in policing multi-level relations, even although the role of Courts as custodians of 
federalism (Bednar 2009) has certainly been smaller in Switzerland, the UK, Belgium 
and Austria than in Germany and Spain. In Switzerland, the Constitutional Court 
cannot invalidate federal law for breaching the constitution, only the people can do so 
by means of a referendum. In the UK, parliamentary sovereignty prevents the 
Supreme Court from invalidating Westminster legislation for breaching the UK 
Parliamentary Acts which conferred devolution to Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland (Hazell 2007). In Belgium, the Constitutional Court has only played a 
marginal role in adjudicating disputes between the Communities, Regions and the 
federal centercentre, even though that role has somewhat increased since the federal 
and Community/Regional governments have no longer been composed of the same 
parties following after the 2004 regional elections (Alen and Muylle, 2008; Erk 2011). 
Finally in Austria the Constitutional Court has not served to curb the rather 
centralized character of the Austrian federation (Gamper 2003).  
In contrast, the German and Spanish Constitutional Courts have had more 
input in balancing federal-regional relations. In Germany, the Constitutional Court 
may not have stopped the gradual centralization of the (West) German federation, but 
it played a role in strengthening the requirement of Bundesrat consent for federal 
legislation, safeguarding the input of the Länder in media and culture policy and 
enforcing a (more) impartial system of fiscal equalization (Laufer and Munch 1998; 
Ziller and Oschatz 1998). In Spain, the difficulty of amending the constitution in 
practice (due to the de facto requirement of bipartisan consent between the two major 
polity-wide parties; the PSOE and PP) gave the Court an important role in clarifying 
the competencies of the centercentre and that of the autonomous communities (for 
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instance, when invalidating sections of the LOAPA agreement which sought to scale 
back and symmetrize the powers of the autonomous communities in the wake of the 
failed 1981 military coup; Agranoff and Ramos Gallarín 1997). However, in recent 
years, the Court has become more discredited. Its composition has become subject to 
political manipulation by the central government and the historic communities 
increasingly consider it as ‘an arm of the Spanish central state’, especially so after its 
highly controversial ruling in which it invalidated part of the recently reformed 
Catalan statute of autonomy (Colino 2009).  
 
4. Explaining Authority Migration II: the Democratic Safeguards of Territorial 
Politics in Western Europe vs. Power Dependencies in Russia 
 
Multi-Level Democracy in Western Europe  
 
The above section demonstrated the weakness of endogenous federal 
safeguards in Russia (limited territorial self-rule, weakening shared rule and a 
relatively toothless Supreme Court). In Western Europe’s multi-level states, self-rule 
is usually stronger and constitutionally entrenched, but there are large variations in the 
shared rule provisions (strong in Germany, Belgium and Switzerland, weaker in Spain 
and Austria and weakest in the UK) and in the relevance of the Supreme or 
Constitutional Court as competence adjudicators (moderate in Germany and Spain, 
weaker in Austria and Belgium and weakest in the UK and Switzerland). Yet, where 
shared rule is limited or the Constitutional Court is relatively insignificant, 
constitutional self-rule is not necessarily at risk. This is so, because territorial 
autonomy is strongly tied to multi-level party competition and democracy (Filippov 
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2004 et al., Hough and Jeffery 2006; Hopkin and Van Houten 2009; Swenden and 
Maddens 2009; Thorlakson, 2007; Stepan, Linz and Yadav 2011).  
For instance, the deepening of regional autonomy in Belgium, Spain and the 
UK can be attributed to the agenda-setting capacity of parties with a regional 
following on the (mostly) polity-wide parties) that dominate the central government. 
In Spain, the polity-wide Social Democrats (in particular) conceded territorial reform 
when they could only muster a central parliamentary majority with the aid of Basque 
or Catalan regionalist parties (Toubeau 2011). Furthermore, the Social-Democrats 
often formed coalition governments with such parties at the regional level (Ştefuriuc 
2009). Thus, the party’s regional branches could pressure its central party wing into 
making territorial concessions that were necessary to keep these regional coalitions 
afloat. In Belgium, the polity-wide parties split up along linguistic lines in response to 
the rise of regionalist challengers (Deschouwer 2009b). Hence, the federalization of 
Belgium is the product of federal governments composed of linguistically split parties 
agreeing to carve up the centre and in doing so to fight off the electoral threat of these 
regionalist competitors. In the UK, Labour inserted devolution to Scotland and Wales 
(and envisaged the same for Northern Ireland following a peace agreement) in its 
1997 election manifesto for central elections, because it so hoped to keep its prospect 
of a considerable electoral following in Scotland and Wales alive, against the 
competition of regionalist challengers (Meguid 2008). In Austria, Switzerland and 
Germany, regionalist parties are weaker, though polity-wide parties acknowledge the 
need to give sufficient autonomy to their regional branches in order to safeguard their 
electoral performance in regional and national elections (Dachs 2003; Sciarini and 
Hug 1999). The German polity-wide Christian-Democrats tolerate the presence of a 
distinctive Christian-Democratic party in Bavaria, while the Social-Democrats allow 
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their branches in the East to working with the former Communists in regional 
coalition governments (Detterbeck and Hepburn 2010). German polity-wide parties 
are truly vertically integrated insofar as regional electoral gains influence federal  
governance prospects, in particular through the Bundesrat which has often served as 
the ‘breeding ground’ for future federal Chancellors (Detterbeck and Jeffery 2009).  
In contrast, in Russia multi-level party competition has done little to safeguard 
territorial autonomy and cannot explain the changing dynamics of Russian federalism 
since the 1990s. In fact, the party system reflects rather than shapes relative power-
dependencies in the Russian federation. Russian parties play a limited role in linking 
federal and regional arenas of electoral competition, because Russia has lacked a 
strongly integrated and competitive party system (Busygina 2010), both before and 
after Putin’s presidency. There are two major differences in the nature of the party 
system that Putin inherited and that of Western Europe’s multi-level states.   
First, a well institutionalized party system assumes that candidates who stand 
for office will do so by rallying behind a party label. In Russia, many candidates 
preferred to run as independents instead (Stoner-Weiss, 2002; Hale, 2006). Low levels 
of party institutionalization could be observed at all levels. For instance, President 
Yeltsin abstained from joining or forming any political party during his eight years in 
office. Some have explained his behavior by arguing that presidents in fledgling 
democracies like to be ‘above’ the parties (which they often consider more as 
factions). Not only Yeltsin but also a majority of regional governors ‘frequently 
destroyed opposition efforts to convey major party substitutes into parties capable of 
being dominant players in the market for electoral goods and services’ (Hale 2006: 
236). Russia’s ‘super-presidential’ system is not conducive to party 
institutionalization nor is its legacy of post-communist patronage networks (Hale 
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2006: 237-38). Well-entrenched parties (with their own organizational bureaucracies) 
tend to develop logics of their own, and ‘leaders often avoid institution-building 
because strong institutions impede the power of individual, personalistic rule over 
policy and politics’ (Stoner-Weiss 2002: 142). Similarly, entrepreneurs with the 
resources to build parties (often wealthy oligarchs who benefited the most from the 
initial transition to a market economy) were not interested in building parties for fear 
that in time these would weaken their privileged access to the state. In the 1990s, the 
refusal to build strong party networks extended to the regional level where governors 
built their own patronage networks, often ran as independent candidates or 
occasionally even pledged membership of more than one party at a time. Stoner-
Weiss (2002) noted that of the 153 candidates who took part in 73 gubernatorial races 
between 1995 and 1997 only about a third had a clear party affiliation.   
Second, for long in Russia, parties were not only weakly developed, but those 
parties that competed at the statewide level (presidential or Duma elections) also 
performed poorly hardly succeeded in winning votes at the regional level 
(gubernatorial or regional parliamentary elections). In the 1990s, the first and often 
crucial decade of a regime transition, political parties did not contribute to the 
integration of a democratic state or the establishment of a competitive political party 
system (Stoner-Weiss 2002). Hence, in the 1990s, parties were not genuinely polity-
wide but territorially bifurcated (Thorlakson 2007).  
 
Power Dependecies and Autocracy-Sustaining Federalism in Russia 
 
If multi-level electoral competition did not safeguard federalism in Russia, 
which factors did so instead?  In the 1990s, the power of a regional governor was 
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defined regardless of his/her belonging to any political party. Political parties were 
weak and intergovernmental relations were not developing through political parties. 
Of greater significance were the personal relations of the governor with President 
Yeltsin and the economic position of the region. Powerful governors could afford to 
violate federal law. Through bilateral treaties with the centre, governors of some 
republics gained privileged access to central resources in exchange for supporting the 
president. A system of ‘segmented regionalism’ emerged (Sakwa 2010: 204) in which 
governors were given a free reign (and even allowed to disregard federal law) so long 
as they supported Yeltsin in federal presidential elections. Bargaining and power-
dependencies played a more important role in determining the balance of powers 
between the centre and the regions than multi-level democracy.  
Some governors considered their region as a ‘personal fief’ and attempted to 
control ‘regional procurators and police chiefs’ because they could serve as ‘important 
weapons to be deployed against local and political economic rivals’ and therefore 
helped to consolidate their grip on regional power (Taylor, 2007: 429; Obydenkova 
and Libman 2012). Regions asserted their power in the Russian federation, but not 
necessarily in a democratic way. Through their control of the local procuracy and the 
MVD (internal ministry), they stopped the centercentre from implementing federal 
law through regional state agencies. Consequently, the centre could not guarantee the 
observance of civil rights and secure the rule of law. About 44,000 legal acts were 
said to violate the constitution or federal legislation (Sakwa 2010: 207).  
Regional support for the federal president in presidential elections was 
contingent upon certain favors being extended to the individual regions (Yeltsin’s 
presidency alone concluded 42 individual treaties with the republics). Indeed, studies 
have shown that in the 1990s there was a high positive correlation between the fiscal 
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subsidies which the federal government allocated to the regions and the percentage of 
voters supporting president Yeltsin within that region.
7
 Regions also engaged in 
foreign relations (often sidestepping the preferences of the federal government), or 
through their economic policies, undermined a common Russian market.
8
 In sum, 
political authority was certainly divided, but unlike in Western Europe this was not 
always the result of open party competition, but rather of a sheer power-struggle 
between the centre and the regions for dominance in the federation (with only some of 
the regions e.g. Novgorod, Arkhangelsk, Samara and St Petersburg possessing a 
relatively democratic nature). Or, as Sakwa put it (2010: 206), ‘the autonomy of sub-
national government may well be the hall-mark of federation, [but] the rich profusion 
of regimes and institutions in Yeltsin’s Russia [with some regions governed as 
authoritarian or super-presidential fiefs, and others as relatively democratic 
governments] cannot automatically be considered hallmarks of a federation.’ 
The election of Putin to Russian President changed the dynamics of the power-
struggle. Putin, a former head of the security service prior to becoming Prime Minister 
(under Yeltsin) and President built his political reputation by projecting a hard-line 
approach against Chechen terrorists. His popular standing also benefited from the 
upsurge in the Russian economy (especially through higher oil revenues for the 
Russian state) around the time of his election and his capacity to broker a ‘polity-
wide’ party ‘United Russia’ (Gel’man 2008, p. 52). However, ‘United Russia’ was 
less central to his strategy of establishing a ‘power-vertical’ than his progressive 
recapturing of coercive state institutions. Only the latter allowed him to impose a 
polity-wide party from above. Here is how Putin achieved this objective.  
In 2000, shortly after he was elected President, Putin decided to establish 
seven super-districts (Federal Districts) the borders of which match Russia’s military 
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districts (instead of already existing interregional associations or socio-economic 
regions). As Ross asserts although Putin’s decision complied with article 83 of the 
constitution which authorizes the president to appoint and remove ‘plenipotentiary 
representatives’, the reform violates the ‘federal idea’, especially since the super-
districts ‘monitor’ regional executive and legislative behavior (Ross, 2003: 35). The 
seven polpredy (presidential envoys or heads of the special districts) have a high 
status, which is reflected in their membership of the Russian Security Council and the 
right to attend cabinet meetings of the federal government. They receive direct 
funding from the federal government and have a staff of about 100. Among their set 
of (extensive) powers we find the right to monitor federal funds earmarked for 
regional authorities of their district, and the task of overseeing the collection of taxes. 
Polpredy can also recommend the president to suspend regional laws or decrees that 
are found to contradict federal laws and to dismiss governors or dissolve regional 
assemblies perceived to be responsible for such constitutional or federal legislative 
breaches. Furthermore, Polpredy appoint the personnel of agencies in charge of 
implementing federal policy within the regions. Due to the extensive list of 
competencies of the federal government this is an important power and regional 
authorities (governors in particular) should have been consulted on such matters, 
especially on judicial appointments and appointments to law enforcement bodies 
(Ross 2003: 36). Importantly, the boundaries as well as the choice of personnel for 
these federal Districts suggest that Putin sought to regain control over the coercive 
agencies of the state. The boundaries of the seven regions coincided with the districts 
of the internal troops of the MVD, and five of the seven districts were headed by so 
called ‘siloviki or men of force’ including two former army generals, two former KGB 
colleagues and one MVD general (Taylor 2007: 431).  
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Having gained greater control over state coercive agencies, Putin silenced 
critical media channels and economic oligarchs with political ambitions, often through 
nationalizing the media, businesses or instigating court cases against oligarchs who 
challenged his authority. However, at least initially, governors and economic 
oligarchs were offered what Gel’man (2008b: 33) refers to as an ‘equidistant 
approach’, they were left alone provided they did not undermine or participate in 
central policy-making.  
The abolition of direct gubernatorial elections in 2004 and the appointed 
nature of the Council of Federation contributed to cutting down the room for party 
competition, and therefore strengthened the power of the President and United Russia 
in the polity. United Russia should be seen as a polity-wide party, which did not 
develop organically, but was intentionally brokered from above. In the view of the 
Kremlin, the ‘power-vertical’ not only had to be extended across the constitutional 
and bureaucratic structure of federalism, but also across its party system. Therefore, it 
brokered United Russia as the merger between Fatherland-All Russia and the Unity 
Party (the former, made up of a large group of powerful governors, nearly defeated 
the party supporting the President in the Duma elections of 1999). Some scholars have 
gone to argue that the survival of a regional governor is dependent on his/her loyalty 
to the President and, thus, to United Russia as a party of the President (Busygina 
2010: 147). However, powerful regional governors often only joined United Russia in 
exchange for significant concessions.  
Finally and concurrently, the centre sought to nationalize and institutionalize 
the party system through electoral legislation. A federal law on political parties 
(enacted in 2001), requires a.o. that parties must have established branches in more 
than 45 regions of the federation and count at least 100 members in each branch. This 
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measure ruled out the presence of parties with a distinctive regional following, a core 
feature of the UK, Spanish and Belgian multi-level party systems. In 2002, another 
law prescribed that half the regional parliamentary members must be elected through 
party lists, reducing the number of regional MPs who can run as independents. The 
abolition of constituency seats for Duma elections further increased the leverage of 
party organizations in the process of candidate selection. Party lists were also 
introduced for regional elections, with the same result. 
Yet, has this strengthening of the centre vis-à-vis the regions and the 
weakening of central democracy also killed federalism, in a sense that it stripped the 
regions of their powers? We see five reasons why the answer is not a clear cut yes.    
First, the reassertion of Presidential and federal powers reduced but did not 
eliminate the scope for asymmetric federal practices and intergovernmental 
bargaining. Since 2000, redistributive grants have been allocated more on the basis of 
common formulas, reflecting the less arbitrary implementation of central policies 
across the regions of the federation (Smirnyagin 2010: 50-54). Equalization payments 
now mostly flow to regions with below average levels of economic development and 
republics no longer receive preferential treatment compared with other regions in the 
state. However, some republics still enjoy a disproportionate share of federal transfers 
for reasons that have nothing to do with their “special status” as republics (Zubarevich 
2010: 91). For instance, Tatarstan and Bashkortostan still receive a disproportionate 
amount from discretionary federal funding streams. Both republics rank 5
th
 and 19
th
 in 
terms of per capita regional fiscal capacity but they receive the bulk of regional 
development funding. This reflects the privileged partnership between both republics 
and the centre (Deryugin and Kurlyandskaya 2007: 252-253). Tatarstan is a net 
recipient of federal transfers and has multiple investment programs that have been 
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explained on dubious grounds (e.g., the “unexpected celebration of 1000 years of its 
capital Kazan”) or have not been explained at all (Zubarevich 2010:  91-3).  
Second, regional actors sometimes had good reason to endorse the 
centralization by the Kremlin, other than the fear for federal coercion. Regional 
governors have often been complicit in sanctioning the abolition of their electoral 
mandate. In the lead up to the 2004 decision to abolish gubernatorial elections, several 
incumbent governors (who had Kremlin support) were ousted from office by 
emerging regional elites and entrepreneurs (Kynev 2010: 113). The defeat of 
incumbent governor A. Surikov (Alta Krai) against popular actor M. Evdokimov is a 
case in point. According to Kynev, the appointment rather than the elections of 
gubernatorial positions provided a more secure way for many incumbent governors to 
retain office even if this meant they had to establish friendly relations with, or became 
members of, the party of power, United Russia (Kynev 2010: 121; Busygina 2010: 
144). 
Third, the centre has not been able to recast Russian federalism where the 
constitutional requirement for gaining regional (popular) consent was difficult to 
circumvent. Putin and the Kremlin, through their ‘amalgamation project’ may have 
preferred to reduce the number of units in the Russian federation considerably below 
the current 83, given that the regions are largely unequal in size and economic 
capacity. Yet, the proposed merger of two ordinary regions (for instance St Petersburg 
and the adjacent Leningrad region or Pskov and Novgorod) came to nothing. Apart 
from the merger of some national autonomies with the compound region, the prospect 
of reducing the ‘matryoskha’ element of Russian federalism even further was stopped 
due to the protest of the affected regional elites (Kosikov 2008). Successful mergers, 
where they succeeded, often resulted from referendums in the affected regions and 
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required the approval of the Federal Assembly, a process which Sakwa (2010: 217) 
describes as ‘thoroughly democratic’.  
Fourth, the capacity of the one dominant party, United Russia, to control its 
regional ‘agents’ (Konitzer and Wegren 2006) can be questioned. Darrell Slider has 
argued that  “[P]atronage systems in most regions [remain] largely under the control 
of regional leaders, independent of United Russia’s national or regional party 
organizations” (Slider 2010: 263). Regional governors with well-developed 
clientelistic networks, economic (e.g., industry concentration), ethnic and 
geographical resources were also more reluctant to join United Russia (Reuter 2010: 
310). United Russia is still considered to be a weak political artifact as it still “lacks 
an effective patronage system” and it is “a subject to pressures from governors who 
are only formally subordinate to the party” (Slider 2010: 257). Some observers even 
go as far as to sayto stay that informal politics, clientelistic relations, and “the myriad 
of informal relations” still remain benchmarks determining centercentre-regional 
politics (Ross 2010: 170), even though they may no longer result in the ‘Treaty 
federalism’ of the 1990s. Regions found ways to maintain power and leverage in 
negotiations with the federal government. According to Chebankova (2008: 997): “the 
Kremlin was unable to appoint the regional leaders unilaterally” and “regional 
economic elites developed a number of effective ways of influencing gubernatorial 
appointments” where “the centre is forced to account for the multiplicity of regional 
interests and act in a certain, decentralised manner”. However, the most powerful 
regional elites are also the most autocratic ones (such as Mintimir Shaimiev from 
Tatarstan who managed to retain great leverage with the centre). The lessons for other 
regions may well be that the increased penetration of family clans into regional 
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politics and businesses strengthens and not weakens a region’s negotiating power with 
the centre.  
Finally, Putin’s reforms should be described as a success in re-centralizing the 
Russian federation but as a failure in unifying loyalties or improving regional 
performance (Slider 2008). Under the new system established by Putin, a governor is 
expected not only to be an effective vote puller for the party of power, United Russia, 
but also as a mediator of regional and federal industrial elite interests (Chebankova 
2008). Yet, regional economic elites often preferred to collaborate with appointed 
governors in those regions that have the most autocratic culture of governance 
(Obydenkova and Libman 2012). In this way, strong governors have become 
indispensible for United Russia and the Kremlin because of their capacity to “destroy 
opposition groups and dissent, and control [the] media, police, courts and election 
commissions” (Slider 2010: 271). In sharp contrast, weak regional governors are 
under constant pressure and total control of the central government (Ibid). Strong, but 
also autocratic regions provide a counterbalance to the federal government, and in this 
sense, prevent the state from becoming unitary. They generate what have remained 
asymmetric intergovernmental relations, in which some regions are subordinated to 
the centercentre and others retain a considerable influence and bargaining power vis-
à-vis the Kremlin and President. Paradoxically, the more autocratic the regional 
regime, the stronger also the division of authority between the centre and the regions, 
and therefore the more federal the intergovernmental relationship.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks: Autocratic versus Democratic Safeguards of 
Federalism 
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 The article provided a comparative analysis of Russian federalism by 
confronting it with the experience of several West European states. That makes sense, 
because of the plurinational and redistributive nature of Western Europe’s multi-level 
states, a feature which they share with Russia. Furthermore contemporary Spanish, 
German and Austrian federalism, like Russian federalism emerged from an 
authoritarian or dictatorial past. Table 2 provides a summary overview of where 
Russian federalism stands (pre and post Putin) in comparison with the multi-level 
polities of Western Europe.  
 
Table 2 About Here  
 
 Scholarly work on federalism makes a distinction between federal form and 
federal practice. There always exists some dissonance between both, but the extent to 
which the constitutional principles of federalism are also observed in practice usually 
depends on a number of safeguards (Bednar 2009). To some extent these safeguards 
are endogenous to federalism itself. Substantive levels of regional autonomy can be 
read from the allocation of administrative and fiscal competencies (self-rule) and the 
presence of a regional political class to put these competencies into use. Or, the 
federal encroachment of regional competencies can be stopped where the regions 
benefit from procedural and structural mechanisms to influence central decision-
making (the shared rule dimension in the second section of the paper or a Court that 
can adjudicate on central-regional or inter-regional disputes of competences).  
 Yet, in Russia, the dissonance between constitutional federalism and federal 
practice is larger than in any of the West European multi-level states. The meaning of 
self and shared rule cannot be read from the Russian constitution. However, and 
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crucially, it cannot be read from the dynamics of party competition either. In Western 
Europe, multi-level electoral party competition, more so than the shared rule 
provisions or judicial safeguards, has played a role in sustaining or deepening 
territorial autonomy. In Spain, Belgium and the UK the challenge and bargaining 
power of regionalist parties propelled the state into a more decentralizing trajectory. 
Hence, the practice of federalism is closely linked to a process of open, fair and multi-
level electoral competition. In sum, it is closely tied to democracy, with both 
processes reinforcing each other.  
In contrast, in Russia, the emergence of a one-party dominant system is 
reflective of rather than a cause of the changing dynamics of Russian federalism. In 
Russia, the practice of federalism is tied more closely to the degree of power-
equivalence between the central and regional elites, and that relationship is not tied to 
the dynamics of party competition. In the period of ‘segmented regionalism’ (between 
1992 and 2000) governors, some of whom lacked democratic credentials, wielded 
strong enough power to resist centralization or to gain concessions from a relatively 
weak but more democratic centre (Stoner-Weiss 2006, Obydenkova 2011). In the 
current period of ‘central authoritarianism’ (since 2000), shared rule mechanisms 
were certainly weakened (as the reduced weight of the Federation Council and its 
partial replacement by an advisory State Council attest). Furthermore, the creation of 
seven federal Super-Districts, headed by powerful presidential envoys and the 
abolition of direct gubernatorial elections jeopardizes the ‘democratic’ quality of 
Russian federalism. In this article, we have argued that this fundamental recalibration 
of Russian federalism into a centrist and authoritarian direction is not so much the 
outcome of creating a one party dominant system ‘from above’. Rather, the 
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emergence of United Russia illustrates the centre’s relative success in recapturing 
state instruments of domination and control.  
Paradoxically however, this at best semi-autocratic system has not killed 
federalism. ‘Political power’ remains vertically divided, especially where the centre 
meets regional governors with a strong power-base linking the economic and societal 
interests of their region. Authoritarian, rather than democratically challenged 
governors are more likely to possess such a power-base. Hence, under Russian 
federalism, regional democracy has weakened the position of governors and regional 
executives vis-à-vis the authoritarian centre, whereas regional authoritarianism has 
strengthened it. The outcome is a state that is at best half democratic (or ‘hybrid’), yet 
federal (where central and regional authoritarianism meet) but centralized and unitary 
(where central authoritarianism faces regional democracy). A quasi-federal central-
regional balance has often come at the expense of and not as a result of democracy. 
The implications of this ‘adaptive’ or ‘disguised’ federalism for federal theory are 
important since in Russia, federal relations are strongest where they are the least 
democratic; upsetting the prevailing view that federalism flourishes best where multi-
level democracy is strongest (Kincaid 2010).   
Realizing the serious deviation from the model of “democratic” federalism, 
Russian scholars often highlight that “the idea of an interconnection between 
federalism and democracy […] is meaningless” (Ivanov 2006, p. 16). This approach 
implicitly points into the direction of federalism without democracy. Indeed, if the 
idea of a multi-level democracy – democracy at the national, regional, and local levels 
– is taken out of federalism, some form of federalism can certainly be found in the 
Russian Federation (Obydenkova 2011). The coming years will be crucial for testing 
the stability of this ‘autocracy-sustaining federalism’ that Putin and his entourage 
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created. Indeed, in the aftermath of parliamentarian and presidential elections and 
massive demonstrations in Moscow and other regions against supposedlyingly 
falsified electoral results, Putin promised to re-introduce direct gubernatorial 
elections. This would be a first and crucial step towards territorial decentralization of 
political power in Russia. The potential unraveling of the current centralized federal 
structures in its current form would almost certainly create further instability, but it 
could also bring along the opportunity for Russia to turn into a truly democratic 
federal state.  
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 Support for the Constitutional Draft was as low as 38.2% in the republic of Adygeya, 40.7% in 
Bashkortostan; 39.9% in Chuvashia; 24.8% in Dagestan, 48.5 in Kalmykia; 27.4% in Karachaevo-
Cherkessia; 36.1% in Mordovia; 29.7% in Tuva (Vaslavsky and Mironiuk, 2010b: 41). 
3
 Fewer than half the electorate showed up in Ingushetia (46%), Khakassia (45,6%), Komi (47,2%), 
Mari-El (46,8%), Udmurtia (44,2%) and Tatarstan (13,4%). The Republic of Chechnya announced 
unilaterally its independence and sovereignty in 1991 and ignored the constitutional referendum (see 
for example Kahn 2002, Ross 2002).  
4
 The design of the Russian federation is not ethnically homogeneous or plurinational in a sense that 
the territorial boundaries of the ethnic entities, i.e. the Republics, autonomous okrugs and autonomous 
oblast (Jewish) rarely coincide with the boundaries of the ethnic groups comprising the federation. 
These boundaries were often ‘put together’ (Stepan 2001) by Stalin in the 1930s and hardly changed 
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thereafter (Stoner-Weiss 2004: 302). For instance, two thirds of the Tatars live outside of Tatarstan and 
a majority of the citizens living in Tatarstan are ethnically non-Tatar. In fact, in nearly half of the 
autonomous Republics the titular ethnic group constitutes a minority. [SOURCE? Ibid?] 
 
5
 As in Russia though, the ‘ethnic’ homogeneity of the territories comprising the minority nations is not 
complete: a considerable share of Basques live outside the Basque Country (including in France), and 
although a majority of citizens who live in the Basque Country identify with the Basque nation, less 
than half master the titular language (Conversi 2002). Similarly, Castilians represent a large share of 
the Catalan population, whereas the Catalan language is also widely spoken in Valencia and the 
Baleares. 
6
 On average, regional and local taxes only account for nine to ten percent of subnational 
government revenues. Furthermore, even taxes that have a regionally set rate are still administered by 
federal tax services (Derygin and Kurlyandskaya 2007: 247-250). Large vertical fiscal imbalances 
(VFI) emerge that need to be closed by federal grants or so-called ‘shared’ federal taxes. The receipts 
of these taxes accrue in part or in their entirety to the regional governments. For instance, the regions 
receive the entire receipts of excises on alcohol products and beer, inheritance tax, enterprise property 
tax, transport tax and taxes on gambling businesses. Federal transfers to sub-national governments are 
the third largest federal expenditure item overall (after pensions and defense).   
 
7
 Other studies stated that transfers were motivated purely by different regional needs (Stewart 1997; 
Smirnyagin 2010, 48) and therefore aided to increase symmetry across the regions in terms of their 
economic development and well-being. 
8
 On foreign relations of sub-national regions of Russia with the EU, see Lankina and Gettachew 2006; 
Obydenkova 2008; 2012. 
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